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To what extent do euroskeptic parties in eastern and Central europe have viable 
alternatives to the european Union and the broad basket of liberal policies promoted 
by the eU? In recent years, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has used his 
overwhelming parliamentary majorities to chart a partially new course, and this article 
inventories one aspect of this new course. The article asks whether Hungary can gain 
any potential benefits from closer links to China as a partial replacement for resources 
that might not be available (or that might be lost) from its more conventional 
european partners to the west. Orbán has often justified both radical constitutional 
change and economic nationalism as powerful medicines to push back against 
Hungary’s vulnerability at the hands of its foreign and domestic enemies. In this  
context, China emerged as both a potential source of new revenue and rhetorical trope 
that seemed to fit in a broader Fidesz discourse of an “eastern opening.” This article 
makes a first attempt to separate rhetoric and reality. It first explores how the ongoing 
consolidation of illiberalism in Hungary has now also sparked a geopolitical reposi-
tioning through the “eastern opening” during Fidesz’s second term.
Second, it seeks to understand the theoretical proposition that new sources of external 
funding—including FDI and government bond purchases—can help enable a state to 
execute such a broad geopolitical shift. To do so, it develops empirical material from 
the fascinating Hungarian efforts to position themselves as a major beneficiary of 
Chinese engagement with europe. The article concludes that Orbán’s policies have 
indeed been broadly consistent with his party’s new rhetoric, but it also concludes that 
the amount of Chinese investment is, in aggregate, still modest to date.
Keywords: Hungary; China; illiberal democracy; vulnerability; Fidesz
It may seem puzzling that the leader of a coalition that has secured two consecutive two-thirds majorities in a national parliament could, nevertheless, feel vulnerable. 
But this appears to be the case of Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. Orbán parlayed his over-
whelming victory in 2010 to instigate what Fidesz—the conservative party that 
he leads—calls the “revolution of ballot boxes.” assertive and defiant in the face of 
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fierce domestic and international criticism, Fidesz has used radical constitutional 
change to generate the kind of Hungary the right wing has long craved.1 These 
changes included alterations of the electoral law, such that his second victory (in 
2014) required only 45 percent of the votes to secure for his coalition2 the two-thirds 
majority needed to continue his full-scale renovation of the Hungarian Constitution.3 
This wholesale constitutional revolution has been widely covered elsewhere.4 The 
point of this article is to examine whether new economic connections might make 
the Fidesz revolution more durable.
In the face of harsh criticism from the european Union for his constitutional 
politics5 and from the International Monetary Fund for his economic program,6 
Orbán has remained defiant. He justifies both radical constitutional change and eco-
nomic nationalism as the kind of powerful medicine that can push back against 
Hungary’s vulnerability and victimisation at the hands of its foreign and domestic 
enemies. Orbán has made no bones about the revolutionary nature of the changes 
introduced. already following Fidesz’s landslide electoral victory in 2010, he stated 
that “a new social contract evolved in the polling booths, when Hungarians showed 
an unprecedented agreement in overthrowing the old system and decided to build a 
new system of national cooperation.”7 Fidesz politicians maintained that a “vicious 
circle of lies” of the socialists combined with the treacherous liberal policies of ear-
lier left-liberal governments had put the country’s economic future in peril.8
In this context of low trust and deep polarisation, Fidesz increasingly asserts that 
the Hungarian nation was a victim of both domestic evil originating from the left-
liberal camp9 and also of international conspiracies since the regime change of 
1989.10 In place of liberalism, Fidesz now proposes an alternative modernisation 
based on Christian values, a strong state, and the broader Hungarian nation, includ-
ing Hungarians in neighbouring european states.11 In short, Fidesz has deployed a set 
of moral claims, purporting to re-acquire Hungary’s strength vis-à-vis its liberal foes 
on the domestic front and international capital and bankers on the european front.12 
In this effort, its two-thirds parliamentary majority, judicial control, and the intermin-
gling of the legislative and executive powers has become its most powerful asset.13 
More recently, Orbán promised to institutionalise an illiberal state in Hungary in 
order for the country to manage a post-2008 crisis world where “anything became 
possible” while alluding to the “success of illiberal and perhaps non-democratic 
countries such as Singapore, China, India, Russia and Turkey” as “stars” in interna-
tional economic performance.14
If it appears striking that a leader with a massive supermajority could feel vulner-
able, it also appears bold that he might see a solution to this vulnerability in closer ties 
with countries with hybrid regimes. emphasising the achievements of illiberal coun-
tries, Orbán argues that for Hungary to prosper in the race for global competitiveness, 
it should explore ways to tear itself away from Western european dogmas such as 
liberalism. This paper has two closely related aims that respond to these twin puzzles. 
It first explores how the ongoing consolidation of illiberalism in Hungary has now 
also sparked a geopolitical repositioning during Fidesz’s second term. In particular, 
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it focuses on Fidesz’s much-emphasised “eastern opening” and analyses the extent 
to which political reality matches the party’s rhetoric. Second, it seeks to understand 
the theoretical proposition that new sources of external funding—including FDI and 
government bond purchases—can help enable a state to execute such a broad geopo-
litical shift. To do so, it develops empirical material from the fascinating Hungarian 
efforts to position themselves as a major beneficiary of Chinese engagement with 
europe.
Moving closer to China is meant by Fidesz as a complement to its simultaneous 
moves away from the eU. as noted, it is somewhat curious that a leader enjoying a 
comfortable second term of government with full control of executive and legislative 
institutions would so consistently emphasise the vulnerabilities of the Hungarian 
nation. Yet a substantial flow of eU regional and structural funds has not damped his 
eurosceptic rhetoric. While eurosceptic or outright rejectionist language toward the 
eU has grown in many countries since the 2008 crisis, only in Hungary has the 
conservative-right presented to the public geographical alternatives to europe. Not 
even in the United Kingdom is this the case, given the British eurosceptics’ general 
emphasis on keeping the “positive” part of europe—usually the Single Market. In 
Hungary, the extreme right Jobbik Party adopted a similar position after the onset of 
the crisis in 2008,15 but our study shows that increasing recourse to vulnerability of 
a small state in the post-2008 crisis world is now emanating from the conservative-
right and manifesting itself in the search for alternatives to eU integration.
To be sure, these ideas did not preclude some continuity in liberal economic 
practices—Johnson and Barnes16 show that Fidesz’s “economic nationalism” 
retained some scope for liberal trade and tax policies, for example. at the same time, 
however, Fidesz pursued other policies of étatisation or nationalisation, implying the 
spreading of public ownership and the reach and the role of the state.17 Voszka argues 
that Orbán neither accepts a minimalist neo-liberal state nor a conventional welfare 
state. Instead, Orban aspires to follow a different route, combining a neo-liberal turn 
in tax and social policy with paternalist policies on the issue of decreasing utility 
costs, that is, energy, water charges for families, while aggressively aspiring to spread 
state ownership over the economy.18 according to Voszka, economic science does 
not have a name for a system that continuously limits state financial support for 
healthcare, education, social welfare support, yet has ambitions of state-capitalism in 
a highly confined economy.19 Whatever one calls it, it has been a spectacular elec-
toral success. Fidesz maintained its political dominance in the 2014 general election, 
retaining a two-thirds majority for its coalition in the parliament (despite an 8-point 
drop in voter support) until the two recent by-elections and winning the subsequent 
european Parliament election by a forty-point margin over the socialists.
Having established the broad outlines of the Fidesz program, this paper proceeds 
in three sections. First, we provide a deeper political and rhetorical context for 
Orbán and Fidesz’s rethinking of contemporary Hungarian strategy towards the 
international political economy. Our emphasis is on the government’s relentless 
theme of reducing Hungary’s perceived overcommitment to West european 
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actors—including the european Union—and Hungary’s purported neglect—under 
the prior social-liberal governments—of other options farther east, including China. 
Second, three case studies—set to increasing levels of perceived vulnerability from 
lowest (retail trade) to highest (bond markets)—investigate the extent to which 
these political-rhetorical priorities can be illustrated with actual behaviour. each 
involves potential linkages to China in the form of retail trade, FDI, and bond 
purchases, respectively. We chose China because it is the only state with both the 
power and resources substantial enough to make plausible the shift to a more distant 
relationship with the eU and the reputation for not imposing strict conditions on its 
investments. as an extensive literature in africa already documents, China thus 
represents a “most likely” case for the theory of FDI-lubricated geopolitical trans-
formations.20 The third section concludes.
Re-imagining Hungary’s Geographical Location: Distance  
from the West, Opening to the East
In examining the fit (or misfit) between Fidesz rhetoric and Hungarian behav-
iour in the proposed re-orientation towards China—which we see as the critical 
country in any kind of sustained “eastern opening”—we must first document 
Hungary’s partial estrangement from the eU. This estrangement began soon after 
the 2010 election as all important positions, including those in the “independent” 
institutions, were quickly filled with Fidesz cadres.21 These institutional changes 
raised fears in the eU of an authoritarian shift in Hungarian politics away from the 
liberal ideals of democracy.22 The 2010 Fidesz modification of the Hungarian 
media law instigated the first major conflict between Orbán’s Hungary and its eU 
partners. The new media law, which gave the executive extensive powers to control 
the media, was introduced just as Hungary assumed the eU Presidency at the end 
of 2010.23 For the eU, the media law was a sign of conservative authoritarian turn 
and was sharply criticised, especially during Orbán’s speeches at the european 
Parliament (eP). at the outset of the Hungarian Presidency, Orbán presented the 
presidency’s program in the eP. To protest Hungary’s new media law, green MePs 
taped shut their mouths, and eP liberals talked about “authoritarian decay.” 
Meanwhile, the head of the Socialist group declared Hungary was unworthy of the 
eU Presidency, and green MeP Daniel Cohn-Bendit said Hungary was on track to 
become a communist surveillance dictatorship. In response, Orbán defiantly 
defended the media law and stated that it was a domestic affair and not to be mixed 
up with the Presidency.24
Orbán also defended his government from its critics both in europe and at home 
in his speech on the occasion of Hungarian National Day, which commemorates the 
1848 Revolution. Referring to his left-liberal opponents as “the ones that organised 
from home to discredit the Hungarians,” Orbán asserted that Fidesz “stands by the 
Hungarians. It showed the door to IMF, introduced taxes on banks, imposed a crisis 
 at University of Worcester on October 30, 2015eep.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Jacoby and Korkut / Vulnerability and economic Re-orientation 5
tax, and reclaimed the pension system from the hands of the stock-market sharks.” 
Orbán then compared Brussels to Moscow, as he continued, “Thus, just as in 1848, 
Hungarians did not let anyone dictate from Vienna, and just as in 1956 and 1990, 
Hungarians did not let anyone dictate from Moscow, today, Fidesz will not let any-
one dictate to the Hungarians from Brussels or anywhere else.”25 Later, in his speech 
in the eP at the termination of the Hungarian Presidency in July 2011, he reiterated 
he would always protect Hungary from those who try to tell the Hungarians what 
they can and cannot do, even if these remarks come from Brussels. Orbán continued 
that europe is in no position to dictate to the Hungarians and that the more he could 
make that clear to Hungarians, the more he could increase support for the european 
project at home.26
Crucially for our purposes, this friction between Orbán and the eU translated into 
a search for new geopolitical alliances to help him manage the pressure from the 
West over his purportedly undemocratic changes—itself a sign of illiberalism in 
Hungary. The primary shape of this alternative path became known as keleti nyitás, 
that is, “opening to the east.” Orbán’s first speech after becoming Prime Minister in 
2010 (Orbán had been PM once before after 1998) was to the Hungarian Permanent 
Conference, a body that represents Hungarian ethnics in the neighbouring countries. 
Orbán stated that while there should be no doubt that they belong to the western 
world, “from now on, this fact will imply another connation. In a simplified or cari-
catured way, we are sailing under the western flag, but in the world economy an 
eastern wind blows. and the sailor that does not take into consideration according to 
which wind to rotate the sails will doom himself and his cargo.”27
Ideologically, conservative Hungarian proponents of this “opening to the east” 
generally emphasise perceived problems with the european economy, such as its 
regulatory architecture, the troubles of the euro, the purported “colonisation of the 
periphery” by the metropolitan center, the construction of a true knowledge-based 
economy only in the core, the deficits of national states, and the decline of education 
levels in the eU.28 In response, left-liberals warn that the discursive formulation of 
“opening to the east” also paves the way to “eastern” styles of leadership and 
governance,29 as well as collaborating with eastern autocrats at the expense of mov-
ing Hungary away from its western partners. For democrats, Hungary’s latest energy 
deal to secure Russian investment in the extension of the Paks nuclear energy plant 
is the most recent expression of this fear.30
In terms of economics, however, the eastern turn promises new raw material 
opportunities and markets for Hungarian firms. according to the under-secretary of 
foreign and external economic relations Péter Szijjartó, the Hungarian opening rests 
on four pillars (quoted in Szretykó31). These are first building close ties with the Far 
east—especially with China; second, strengthening co-operation with the Caucasus 
countries such as georgia, azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan as their trade strategies fits well 
with the supply structure of the Hungarian market; third, paying more attention and 
refining the trade links with the arab world; and finally, within europe, concentrating 
on the western Balkans.32
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Of course, these themes are not new in Hungarian history. already in the interwar 
period, the Hungarian right desired to reach out to the eastern nations, that is, Turán. 
More recent eurasianist, neo-Turánist thought on the Hungarian right aspires to ter-
minate Hungary’s alliance with the euro-atlantic community and instead form a 
cultural, political, and economic alliance with the Uralo-altaic tribes, such as Turkic 
nations in Siberia, Russia, Central asia, and nations of Mongolia, Korea, and Japan.33 
Reflecting on the Fidesz response to the post-2008 banking crisis, Csizmadia et al. 
show there are many similarities between the modern politics of Hungary and the 
politics during the global economic crisis of the interwar economic environment that 
generated Turanism.34 Similarities include the importance of nonallied politics, eco-
nomic unorthodoxy, and hostility to banks and elites. Such extreme right positions 
have implications for Orbán insofar as he depicts western liberals and international 
capitalists as the main players that brought about Hungary’s economic and political 
collapse in 2000s. In response, Fidesz directs a radical foreign policy to rectify the 
“asymmetric” relations that connect Hungary to the West. This foreign policy veers 
away from the traditional left-liberal foreign policy of Hungary and dwells con-
stantly on Hungary’s historical traditions and experiences while retaining an extreme 
sensitivity about national sovereignty.35
Case Selection and Case Studies of Hungary’s “China Options”
This article develops three cases to explore the extent to which the Fidesz 
rhetoric of an eastern opening has been translated into action by Hungarian actors. 
Our case selection is on the basis of Orbán’s stated goal of decreasing Hungarian 
vulnerability and, in particular, its purported overreliance on Western europe. We 
begin with a case—retail trade featuring Chinese immigrants in Budapest—in 
which any Hungarian vulnerability is fairly modest. While Fidesz has been critical 
of some retail chains headquartered in Western europe and expresses a clear pref-
erence for Hungarian retailers, we have found no evidence of a strong public aver-
sion (so far) to retailers headquartered in Western europe. Still, there is some 
potential for Chinese merchants to appear as a viable alternative to West european 
chains in some areas, particularly textiles, household goods, and electronics. To be 
sure, Chinese retailers are far smaller than western chains, and yet given Hungarian 
consumer preferences (especially amidst rising poverty),36 Chinese retailers pro-
vide crucial outlets, especially in textiles and clothing. We then move to FDI—
M&a in the Hungarian chemical sector—as an intermediate case. Here, the 
Hungarian government is somewhat more vulnerable in the sense that employment 
and tax receipts are generally dependent on FDI. even in fat times before the cri-
sis, Hungary—like all Central and east european (Cee) states with the possible 
exception of Slovenia—scrapped hard for FDI from multinationals headquartered 
in Western europe.37 In lean times, they scrap even harder, though the Fidesz 
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governments have sought to decrease reliance on Western FDI. We conclude with 
an arena in which Hungary can be seen as highly vulnerable and indeed desperate 
for outside investment—bond purchases. Fidesz has gone so far as to offer 
Hungarian resident status and a path to citizenship to foreigners who invest in as 
little as €250,000 in Hungarian government bonds, an instrument clearly aimed at 
Chinese traders and investors. The big prize, however, would be institutional 
investment from the Chinese state, which could certainly soften the Hungarian 
state’s vulnerability to international investors.
all of these cases arguably matter to Hungary. While the paper faces the limits in 
external validity always associated with case studies, picking large, high-profile 
cases is essential for testing any ideas about the role of vulnerability. almost by defi-
nition, small projects are the ones whose failure is unlikely to have dramatic political 
consequences for either Chinese firms or Cee polities. Nevertheless, the selection of 
these cases is crucial as they indicate the interest of a major economic power, such as 
China, in a small country whose government has been keen to reframe its geopoliti-
cal associations in an effort to diversify and enhance its exports as well as attract 
investment in industrial and infrastructure projects.
We selected China as the potential external patron that makes the most plausible 
and powerful economic alternative to europe. To be clear, we do not expect Hungary 
to renounce its eU membership or to sever the lucrative ties it enjoys through the 
Single Market. But in assessing whether Orbán’s rhetoric is backed by real actions, 
we need a concrete alternative that the state might use to lessen its dependence on 
europe—a dependence we have shown to be a Fidesz obsession and a central part of 
Orbán’s political communication to Hungarian voters. While Orbán certainly refers 
to other countries as possible inspirations for economic success, he frames Hungarian 
relations in terms of a “historical friendship” with China that seems to us substan-
tially more comfortable than those with Russia or Turkey, to name two other regional 
powers that could offer some leverage vis-à-vis the eU. During Orbán’s visit to 
China, he argued that
the friendship between Hungary and China is not stimulated by the economic success 
of China, and similarly Hungary did not become China’s friend or recognise China 
when the asian state turned into a determining state of the world economy, but [their 
friendship] started decades ago before that. The Hungarian and Chinese relations stem 
from hearts, build on common sympathy, for the Hungarian people primarily all about 
historical, spiritual and cultural accomplishments [of the Chinese nation].38
Based on this friendship narrative, we next illustrate how Fidesz shifted from an 
earlier Sinophobic to its now Sinophile position. We stress how Fidesz has pursued a 
rapprochement with China since 2010 and (somewhat puzzlingly) kept quiet about 
Chinese acquisitions in Hungary despite Orbán’s renewed calls for public control of 
economic production in Hungary.39
 at University of Worcester on October 30, 2015eep.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
8 east european Politics and Societies and Cultures
Low Levels of Vulnerability: Ethnic Chinese and Retail Sales in 
Hungary
a familiar image of the Chinese abroad involves occupational specialisation in 
retail and trade. While many Westerners are drawn to such “Chinatowns” for good 
meals, they are often also attractive for the availability of a wide range of cheap 
retail goods. In theoretical terms, retail sales is a relatively “easy” domain for 
Hungary’s eastern opening, insofar as no complex, high-value added manufacturing 
is required, no large amounts of capital, and no major direction by the state. In prin-
ciple, retail sales are an area of perceived low vulnerability. That said, Fidesz joins 
a long list of traditionalist parties in Western europe that have harboured intermittent 
attempts to demonise supermarkets, whether domestically owned or foreign-owned 
(see Berger and Piore40). Beyond the most general rhetorical level, however, there is 
little reason to expect Fidesz to see retail sales as a sector in which Chinese activity 
can assist the geopolitical re-orientation hinted at in Orbán’s speeches. as such, it 
provides a good initial baseline of low vulnerability.
While Chinese populations exist in all Central and east european (Cee) states, 
the size of the Chinese merchant group in Hungary is clearly largest.41 Visa-free 
travel from China to Hungary in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to a spike of about 
thirty thousand immigrants into (mostly) Budapest in just a few years. Working ini-
tially from the sale of textiles shipped in suitcases along the Trans-Siberian railway, 
the immigrant network eventually shifted to shipping containers. Today, Budapest is 
often referred to as the “hub” of Chinese activity in Cee.42 The Hungarian Office of 
Immigration and citizenship show there are now around 14,300 legal Chinese resi-
dents in Hungary.43
While still a modest number in a country of ten million people, the economic 
crisis caused Chinese retailers to grow in importance for Hungarian consumers. In 
part, Chinese retailers simply survived where others failed. For example, in 2012, the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office estimated that asian retailers had maintained 20 
percent of Hungary’s textile and clothing retail sector and had avoided the wide-
spread closures that hit Hungarian firms. Moreover, since many Hungarian firms 
purchase goods from Chinese retailers, the 20 percent figure likely undercounts their 
influence in the sector.44 Chinese retailers also specialize in goods for lower income 
groups, thus playing a key distributive role amidst rising poverty.45 Thus, while 
Chinese retailers are not comparable to western retail chains in terms of their size 
(and therefore may not attract a similar reaction from Fidesz), they are still important 
in the Hungarian socio-economic environment.
These cross pressures are evident in recent dealings with Budapest’s Chinese 
Market, long the epicentre of Chinese commercial activity in Hungary. When the 
Fidesz-led 8th District government recently closed one section of the market, there 
was an immediate outcry from lower income groups. However, the larger section of 
the market (to which many owners in the now-closed section had already moved) 
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continues to function. Beyond retail, the importance of the Chinese Market is its 
centrality to the supply chain for Chinese goods to other retailers in Hungary and 
beyond.46 Thus, despite the anti-Chinese tone in the right-wing media during the 
closure, the 8th District government ensured that the larger section of the market was 
to remain. This combination seems to have allowed a certain venting of anti-Chinese 
feeling without any real threat to access to Chinese goods.
and yet Fidesz has also flanked its modest restrictions on Chinese merchants with 
a degree of welcome. It is not obvious that a conservative and nationalist party like 
Fidesz would look with approval on the Chinese minority, especially if they bring 
commerce in a sector—retail—where Hungarians are unlikely to feel vulnerable to 
West european pressures. Certainly, there has been plenty of suspicion about the 
Chinese in Hungary. Nyíri reports that representative annual surveys of Hungarians 
report that between 70 and 80 percent disapprove of the Chinese presence and com-
pares the discourse there to prior waves of anti-Semitism and “yellow peril” dis-
courses.47 There have been some ethnically motivated attacks on Chinese residents. 
Moreover, Hungary recently introduced a very strict immigration regime aimed pri-
marily at refugees from Kosovo and the Middle east.
In light of this background, the Fidesz government struck a self-congratulatory 
tone in remarks about the 20 percent increase in the number of Chinese visitors to 
Hungary in 2014. The Deputy State Secretary for Tourism stated that Hungary places 
a major emphasis on the development of tourism connections with China, for which 
the Chinese Centre for Tourism Coordination in Central and eastern europe (based 
in Budapest) offers a good foundation.48 Hungary also saw an official delegation 
from the Chinese State Office of Tourism in March 2015, whose president was 
awarded an honorary professorship. at the ceremony, the Hungarian government 
noted its “eastern opening” and emphasised the importance of Chinese tourism to 
Hungary.49
Such conciliatory language should be seen in the broader context for the shift that 
it is. Over the longer term, Fidesz generally has taken a skeptical position towards 
Hungary’s Chinese residents. Fidesz campaigned in their unsuccessful 2006 election 
on a platform that included restrictions on Chinese immigration. In 2008, Fidesz 
called on the Hungarian Parliament to warn China to respect human rights and called 
on the Hungarian government to hold meeting on Tibetan autonomy between Beijing 
and the Dalai Lama. Hence, Orbán’s emphasis on “sixty years of friendship” between 
Hungary and China was not there prior to the 2010 election. at various points, Fidesz 
officials have blamed Chinese merchants for contributing to a wide range of social 
and economic ills, including smuggling, unfair competition, promoting illegal immi-
gration, and undermining local labor and product markets. To be sure, this was not a 
rhetoric exclusive to Fidesz, and Hungarian politicians often engaged in aggressive 
crackdowns against Chinese merchants.50
Since re-taking power, however, Fidesz has considerably softened its anti-Chi-
nese populist rhetoric. even Fidesz members with human rights concerns frame 
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relations with China in a way that the Hungarian economic interest is more important 
than standing by human rights. The Tibet issue appears to have fallen entirely from 
Fidesz’s human rights agenda. In fact, the Hungarian Office of Immigration and 
Nationality authorities forced a few Tibet activists to visit their offices in order to 
keep them off the streets during the 2011 Hungarian visit by the Chinese Prime 
Minister. While still in opposition, Fidesz politician Zoltán Balog was the head of the 
Human Rights Commission of the Hungarian Parliament in 2009 and took part in 
demonstrations in support of Tibet at the fiftieth anniversary of Chinese invasion of 
Tibet.51 after Fidesz returned to power, Balog became a keen supporter of coopera-
tion between Hungary and China, even lobbying for the introduction of traditional 
Chinese medical practice to Hungary.52
Finally, the Hungarian state has often used tax raids as a check on Chinese mer-
chants, and here, too, we see some shifts in Fidesz’s behavior.53 For example, 
Hungary’s National Tax and Customs administration (NaV) is the only state agency 
that now hosts a Chinese-language Internet page. This page provides Chinese traders 
information on Hungarian customs and tax regulations in their own language.54 We 
read this as tentative evidence that, in spite of its continued populist measures against 
Chinese traders, Fidesz also seeks to better facilitate Chinese traders acting within 
the Hungary’s tax and customs laws.55
The changes in tone and behavior noted in this section are consistent with the 
broader “vulnerability discourse” nurtured by Fidesz and its outspoken Prime 
Minister and noted at the outset of the article. Fidesz had harshly criticised the outgo-
ing socialist-liberal government for purportedly caving in to eU and IMF demands 
for austerity. Orbán also sparked a testy exchange with european officials with his 
denunciation of “debt slavery” for Hungarians with euro- or Swiss franc–denomi-
nated loans. In this context, he has suggested that Hungary’s single-minded focus on 
the european market led it to miss out on other markets, including China and Russia. 
This section demonstrates that Fidesz moderated its rhetoric and behavior in this 
broad direction. It ensured that populist anti-Chinese moves like the partial closure 
of the Chinese market were done in a way that left the vast bulk of the market intact; 
it focused its nativist discourse more on new (and potential) Middle eastern and 
Balkan refugees than on long-time Chinese residents; and it took some steps to help 
Chinese merchants improve their tax and customs compliance. That said, when it 
comes to manipulation of Chinese merchants, it is wise to assume that Fidesz retains 
a well-developed skill set.
The conclusions of this first section are modest. It has established that there is a 
notable shift in Fidesz rhetoric toward China that is consistent with the hypothesis 
that its “eastern opening” policy may be more than just cheap talk. Fidesz has 
changed its discourse in ways that cannot be explained by underlying shifts in voter 
attitudes, which remain highly skeptical of Chinese residents.56 In theoretical terms, 
since Hungary can pressure West european firms in the area of retail sales, there is 
little reason to look for Hungarians to perceive Chinese commercial activity as 
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existential or even highly important. even here, however, there is some evidence of 
a shift in rhetoric and behavior, and this “clean” case does help establish an important 
shift in the Fidesz baseline.
Medium Levels of Vulnerability: Chinese M&A in the Hungarian 
Chemical Sector
a pillar of Fidesz discourse has been the purportedly predatory nature of MNCs 
based in the eU-15. after the collapse of communism in 1989, Hungary was aggres-
sive and early in its courtship of FDI from such firms. In part, this early openness to 
FDI was linked to the country’s staggering debt to Western banks at the collapse of 
communism.57 In part, this orientation owed much to Hungary’s late-communist era 
experience with european product and capital markets (and their familiarity with 
Hungary). In any event, the industrial FDI case allows us more scope to analyse this 
paper’s animating hypothesis that China might function for Fidesz as a partial substi-
tute for Western commercial activity and a partial solution to the vulnerability decried 
by Fidesz. The case shows that even in a very sensitive industrial sector with a firm 
systematically important to the Hungarian industrial economy, the Fidesz government 
has been supportive of a leading role for Chinese MNCs. While this is not shocking 
given that no Hungarian purchasers for this firm were available, it does run counter 
to the rising Fidesz criticism of foreign investment.58 at the same time, it is consistent 
with the pattern of a shift in Fidesz rhetoric and behavior vis-à-vis China.
Of course, internationalising Chinese firms often have gone after mature european 
firms, but this has been far less common in Cee than in the eU-15. Between 2000 
and 2010, Thompson Reuters data show eighty-four Chinese M&a deals in the 
eU-15. Only seven such deals were registered in Cee—five in Hungary and two in 
Bulgaria. Moreover, none of these were in industrial sectors.59 The most obvious 
explanation for this is that while Cee has plenty of struggling industrial firms and 
many firms with excellent technology, twenty years of intense FDI interest from 
Western europe has left the region with few firms that fit both descriptions and thus 
make likely M&a targets. european M&a opportunities are clearly important for 
Chinese firms. Deloitte forecast in 2012 that europe would be the site of about half 
of all Chinese M&a activity abroad by 2014 (up from only 15 percent in 2007).60 
One potential motive for M&a lies in european firms’ technology.61 Many of the 
splashy potential M&a deals have involved West european auto companies, and 
there has been an obvious reluctance of Western automakers to sell even highly dis-
tressed assets like Saab to Chinese firms.62
given Orbán’s nativist discourse and set against this broader pattern of european 
caution about a leading Chinese role in core industrial sectors, it would not have been 
shocking if Fidesz had prohibited a controlling position by a Chinese firm in an 
important firm with ties to the very strategic Hungarian auto industry. The acquiring 
Chinese firm’s efforts to disguise its intentions for as long as possible may add 
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additional credence to the notion that Hungarian government support could not be 
taken for granted.63 as we will see, however, the government chose to facilitate the 
Chinese purchase.
The case in question is the largest industrial M&a project in all of Cee: the take-
over of Hungarian chemical firm (BorsodChem) by a Chinese firm (Wanhua 
Industrial group).64 Valued at $1.7 billion, this investment was meant to provide 
Chinese engagement “up and down the value chain,” in the words of Wanhua’s CeO. 
The acquisition positioned Wanhua as a major producer of raw materials for the 
foams deployed in the auto, insulation, construction, and furniture sectors. The deal 
also obliged Wanhua to invest about €140 million in a separate new greenfield plant 
in eastern Hungary. When the UK-based investment group that owned BorsodChem 
initially resisted outside overtures, Wanhua, working with the Budapest-based branch 
of the Bank of China, moved secretly to acquire substantial interest in the firm. In the 
end, this interest was revealed, and the takeover was not hostile. Post-deal publicity 
stressed the expanded opportunity for BorsodChem in asian markets, and the new 
Fidesz government strongly backed the accord.65
In July 2014, Wanhua then announced further investments of €88 million, flatter-
ing the Hungarian government by pitching the deal as a sign of strategic partnership 
between Hungary and China. Péter Szijjartó, the State Secretary in charge of 
Hungary’s external economic relations as well as its eastern opening policy, indi-
cated that this investment was an important sign that Wanhua had settled on Hungary 
as its regional center. Szijjartó also framed the investment an important opportunity 
to increase the share of chemicals in Hungarian exports. Both the government and 
the eximbank officials noted with obvious satisfaction Chinese interest in a poor and 
backward area of Hungary. The firm still employs 2,500 workers.66 The new invest-
ment was also perceived as a welcome gesture from China to Hungary amidst the 
aftermath of Orbán’s recent speech praising illiberalism against western dogmas.67
as in the initial case study, there is again some evidence of a change in both the 
substance and tone of Fidesz policy. In establishing this claim, it helps that the 
BorsodChem privatisation issue has been going on for more than a decade. In 2001 
during his first term as a Prime Minister, Orbán faced queries about Russian interest 
in the firm. at the time, Orbán noted that, “Hungary, as an open economy, does not 
distinguish among investors by nationality but it does expect all investors to keep to 
the rules.” He also added that it would be “unfortunate if Russian investors who acted 
fairly were met with antipathy in Hungary.”68 Yet as we saw earlier, Fidesz has since 
dropped its emphasis on open economy in Hungary and has become a vigorous sup-
porter of statist solutions in many sectors. Moreover, acceding to new M&a projects 
can be risky for a state. Failed M&a projects can leave states with a big black eye, as 
occurred when Chinese firms acquired and then closed down high-profile electronics 
firms in Western europe during the 1990s.69 It is thus curious to see the sale to a 
Chinese firm of a 96 percent stake in the country’s second largest chemical company 
finalised under the Fidesz government in 2011.70 To some extent, of course, the sale 
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is consistent with Orbán’s past openness to foreign investment regardless of national 
basis, as well as his current efforts to legitimise a non-european commercial alterna-
tive to Western european firms. In this endeavour, it may help that the region where 
BorsodChem is located—Borsod-abaúj-Zemplén county—is the focus of additional 
Chinese investment. This area is the poorest region in all of Hungary.71
More generally, Fidesz has reason to hope that Chinese FDI is on the ascent. 
Potentially very important news in this regard came when China announced a 
$10-billion “special credit line” for use in the broader Cee region. Within that larger 
project, China seeks to develop one “economic and technological zone” in each 
country. In July 2013, the Hungarian exim Bank concluded an agreement with the 
Chinese export-Import Bank for €100 million in loans to finance the expansion of 
exports to China from companies operating in Hungary.72 an additional $500 million 
has been designated by China as an “investment cooperation fund” for Cee. This 
announcement came with the establishment of a “Business Forum” to coordinate the 
growing interest in Cee. The first meeting was in Budapest in June 2011, the second 
in Warsaw in april 2012, and the third in Bucharest in November 2013. In September 
2012, China established a Secretariat for China-Central and eastern europe 
Cooperation. In December 2012, the first “annual” meeting of the Secretariat was 
held in Beijing. The Secretariat includes all ten Cee states in the eU plus six others, 
mostly in the Western Balkans. It involves eighteen units of the Chinese government 
and is led by the Ministry of Foreign affairs. each Cee state is to appoint one lead 
official or agency to coordinate its interactions with the Secretariat.
given that the proposed investment figures are roughly three times the size of 
existing Chinese investment in Cee, the Secretariat is potentially a very large devel-
opment. To be sure, it will be a few more years before it is clear the extent to which 
the many memoranda of understanding result in substantial new FDI projects. even 
if all Chinese promises come to fruition, this would be dwarfed by the stock of West 
european FDI in Hungary. Thus, if the Fidesz metric is for China to replace Western 
europe, this case offers little support for such a grandiose and implausible ambition. 
Yet if a more modest ambition of shifting the Hungarian economy farther away 
from Western european influence is credited, then this case offers some supportive 
evidence.73 at minimum, this section has established that the shift in Fidesz rhetoric 
has a clear behavioral correlate. It has been accompanied not just by toleration of a 
high-profile FDI acquisition by a large Chinese firm but indeed by active govern-
ment support of that acquisition and this despite a growing Fidesz enthusiasm for 
statist projects vis-á-vis Hungarian firms.74
Of course, this outcome is also consistent with Chinese desires to use Hungary as 
a “springboard” to enter the rest of the eU.75 The eU Single Market already allows 
the Chinese whose work in Hungary is legal to ply their wares across a market of 
nearly five hundred million consumers. Such “springboarding” ambitions are natu-
rally paired with concerns about transport networks. Fidesz is clearly keen to attract 
Chinese investment in transportation infrastructure, such as the announced railway 
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link with Serbia that may connect further to railway projects across Turkey and via 
the main greek port (Piraeus) to establish freight links with China.76 To be sure, the 
lack of direct airline connection between Budapest and China remains a major gap 
(and source of ongoing discussions). Still, the increasing importance of Hungary is 
touted by Minister of Foreign affairs Szijjártó as an indication that Hungary is win-
ning the european competition to become China’s key partner in implementing the 
wider “One Zone, One Road” strategy.77
While it is far too soon to tell if such hype is justified, the very ambitions point to 
an important shift in the broader “vulnerability discourse” highlighted by this article. 
To date, the most visible Fidesz talk about vulnerability decries the supposed manipu-
lation of Hungarians by powerful Western MNCs and banks and by eU officials.78 
However, a second vulnerability debate turns on the idea that Hungary will be left out 
of promising commercial developments. The Hungarian debate about FDI has always 
had a strong undercurrent of fear that its attractiveness as a business location may not 
last. To stay attractive, Hungary will need to improve its inadequate road and shipping 
infrastructure. Due mostly to bottlenecks around Budapest, the average rail speed in 
Hungary is a shockingly low 2 km/hour. So if Hungary wants to keep its central posi-
tion in broader distribution networks—including those of Chinese firms and Chinese 
merchants—it will need to keep up with or surpass the quickly emerging Slovakian 
rail distribution services, which are also fueled by the needs of a highly integrated 
auto manufacturing sector.79 Thus, Fidesz’s support for the purchase of BorsodChem 
by a Chinese firm is not surprising and fits a broader pattern—both rhetorical and 
behavioral—of accommodating Chinese investment. By extension, the loose pattern 
identified in the retail sales case is somewhat stronger in the case of FDI. The final 
case shows it is stronger still in the one area where Chinese actors could very substan-
tially reduce Fidesz reliance on Western economies: purchases of government bonds.
High Vulnerability: Fidesz and Chinese Bond Purchases
Our final case discusses an area of substantial vulnerability for Hungary, a country 
whose public debt to gDP levels have grown from under 60 percent in 2005—the 
legal limit for euro member states, which it is obliged to eventually become—to about 
85 percent in 2014.80 When the financial crisis hit europe in 2007–2008, a number of 
observers took note of Chinese investment missions to europe.81 Many soon began 
to speculate on the possible role of China in providing a new source of liquidity to 
suddenly reeling european economics, especially for those states not in the eurozone 
and thus ineligible for special liquidity plans of the european Central Bank. The bulk 
of the conversation turned on Chinese actions in Western europe, particularly among 
the crisis-weakened Mediterranean states struggling to find access to the normal bond 
markets. That said, there were flickers of interest in Cee as well.
Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, Cee economies have felt particu-
larly vulnerable to the withdrawal of capital. Debt-financed consumption had become 
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a very important part of the political economy of much of the region.82 This trend 
was most pronounced in the Balkans, but it was a powerful force also in Hungary, 
Romania, and Bulgaria, and somewhat less so in Poland, Slovakia, and especially, 
the Czech Republic. To be sure, most of this was private debt, as most countries had 
relatively small external public debt balances, and—mostly because the vast major-
ity of their banks had been bought out by larger banks based in the eU-15—there was 
little chance that sovereigns would have to bail out their own financial sector, a path 
that had led to massive problems with “sovereign” debt in countries like Ireland, 
Portugal, and Spain.83 Yet while most Cee states have recovered reasonably well, a 
broader european debate has raged about whether China would ride to the rescue and 
buy the sovereign bonds of european states in desperate need of financing, mostly to 
roll over the very cheap short-term debt that so many had become accustomed to 
using prior to the crisis.84
That scenario is not, on its face, implausible. Cee states had trouble on bond 
markets, including three that had to take standby loans from the International 
Monetary Fund (Latvia, Romania, and Hungary). Newspaper headlines have trum-
peted the more general hope/expectation/fear (depending on the paper) that China 
would become a big player in financing states through the economic crisis. But evi-
dence for this has been extremely hard to find. The primary reason for the difficulty 
in assessing this idea is that the major Chinese sovereign wealth vehicles—such as 
the State administration of Foreign exchange (SaFe) and China Investment 
Corporation (CIC)—do not make public the composition of their bond holdings.85
In this context, Hungary emerges as an extreme case. Fidesz had harshly criti-
cised the outgoing Socialist government for caving in to eU and IMF demands for 
austerity. as noted, Orbán’s subsequent denunciation of “debt slavery” for 
Hungarians holding euro- or Swiss franc-denominated loans went hand in hand 
with his claim that Hungary’s single-minded focus on the european market had led 
it to miss out on other markets, including China, Russia, and Central asia. He occa-
sionally vilified the IMF and made a concerted effort to avoid calling on new 
tranches of aid in Hungary’s Standby agreement with the Fund. When rating agen-
cies downgraded Hungarian bonds to junk (BBB) status, Hungarian interest in alter-
native buyers soared.
For a time, it seemed possible this strategy might bear fruit. Most prominently, 
during his summer 2011 visit to Budapest, Premier Wen Jiabao noted that China 
planned to buy “a certain amount of Hungarian government bonds.”86 In 2010, the 
CIC added an “emerging europe” equity fund to its portfolio.87 Moreover, various 
Chinese officials had long underscored their support for buying european sovereign 
debt. For example, People’s Bank of China governor Zhou Xiaochuan said in 
February 2012, “China will always adhere to the principle of holding assets of eU 
sovereign debt.”88
Yet subsequent developments caused a change in tone and substance. The CIC 
posted losses of 4.3 percent in its overseas portfolio in 2011, which more or less 
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cancelled out a similar gain in 2010.89 The overseas portion makes up about one-third 
of the fund’s nearly half-trillion-dollar capital base.90 Part of the disappointing 
returns was driven by the performance of european government bonds and prompted 
Chinese officials to signal more interest in investing in european infrastructure and 
industrial projects instead,91 a priority that has continued through the annual meet-
ings noted in the last case study, particularly the Romanian meeting. The CIC then 
announced in May 2012 that it would no longer buy european sovereign debt, though 
it would continue to look for opportunities for tangible investments in europe. 
according to the head of the CIC, “We still have our people looking at opportunities 
in europe, even though we don’t want to buy any government bonds.”92
With the hopes dashed that China would buy substantial amounts of government 
debt, Fidesz changed its tactics. Most striking, it passed a 2012 law that grants per-
manent residency to any person purchasing at least €250,000 in Hungarian state 
bonds.93 at the time, Hungarian vulnerability was quite high given the standoff with 
the eU and IMF over conditions for the release of further tranches of adjustment 
assistance. With the country’s access to markets limited, sovereign bond purchases 
by residents were a high priority or, barring sufficient demand from citizens, through 
the “residency bonds.” Fidesz lawmakers acknowledged that Chinese investors are a 
key target. Hungarian press reports call asian businessmen the “overwhelming 
majority of applicants” and note that the Fidesz politician who conceived the scheme 
is closely linked to the Chinese firm that bought BorsodChem.94 Raising government 
funds €250,000 at a time and in a way that incurs the wrath of other eU member 
states only highlights how desirable was the initial arrangement for Chinese state 
actors to buy bonds directly.95
Thus, while Fidesz behaviour was again consistent with the broad hypothesis that it 
is seeking new forms of financial support outside the traditional West european 
sources, in this case the Fidesz efforts have been met with a negligible result. For now, 
though, Hungary mostly has been a supplicant on international markets as a result of 
struggling (once again) to refinance its debt on affordable terms. Perhaps the Fidesz 
government will succeed in selling citizenship to a large number of Chinese investors. 
We will have to stay tuned to see how these early trends develop. For now, though the 
numbers are small, european states certainly fear the instrumentalisation of an eU 
member state that sells to individuals access to a hard-won common achievement—the 
Schengen Zone.96 When the receipts of such sales could essentially bring the resources 
that government needs to continue evading its other european responsibilities, one can 
understand that dismay is the modal reaction in other european capitals.97
Conclusion
Hungary is, by some distance, the most interesting Cee state from which to view 
China. This fact is attributable not just to Hungary’s immediate postcommunist 
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openness to FDI at a time when the other Cee states generally resisted FDI, nor even 
exclusively to the big wave of Chinese immigrants who found a doorway into 
Hungary in a liberal postcommunist immigration law and have stayed on.98 It is also 
attributable to the populist politics of the current Fidesz government, which puts a 
high priority on avoiding further IMF assistance and looks to non-eU sources to 
fund its very high state debt. While there have been hopes that China might warrant 
the “savior” narrative occasionally invoked in popular literature,99 these hopes in 
Hungary appear to have led to little, so far.
To be sure, the claim that Hungary’s eastern opening has, to date, brought little 
must be re-assessed in years to come in light of the dispersion of the promised $10 
billion in Cee investment. In the meantime, a few general points emerge from this 
analysis. This paper analysed the general theoretical proposition that new sources of 
FDI and other kinds of foreign commercial activity (retail and trade networks and 
bond purchases) can help enable a state to execute a broad geopolitical shift. The 
article’s first and primary contribution was to present evidence that the ruling Fidesz 
Party in Hungary desires such a shift. The party (and its outspoken prime minister) 
talks the talk, but it also seems to walk the walk, choosing policy options that could 
not be easy for a conservative and nationalist party with a strongly traditionalist ori-
entation. The evidence in all three cases showed behavioural changes consistent with 
the new rhetorical directions set out after 2010 and subsequently radicalised. In the 
first case, the core behavioral change was away from Fidesz’s prior populism against 
Chinese residents. In the second case, it was Fidesz’s preference for supporting 
Chinese M&a activity in an important firm associated with the all-important auto 
sector and over the party’s oft-expressed preference for more statist control. In the 
third case, the evidence clearly supported concerted Fidesz efforts to stimulate 
Chinese institutional purchase of government bonds along with smaller schemes to 
promote individual purchases by Chinese nationals.
The paper’s second contribution was to document that despite behavioural 
changes that are consistent with an effort to attract Chinese resources to partially 
supplant european ones, Fidesz has relatively little to show in economic terms for its 
efforts so far.100 Certainly, the two fundamental problems of its economy remain 
pressing as high state debt and low employment still put suffocating downward pres-
sure on Hungarian economic development. In the lower vulnerability area of retail 
trade, Fidesz policy may make life more comfortable for a group of people whose 
commercial activity tends to make available low-cost goods that are in high demand 
in difficult economic circumstances. While such firms may often pose a competitive 
threat to native Hungarian shops—thus threatening one Fidesz constituency—their 
low prices are a popular buffer at a time of very weak Hungarian labor markets and 
a wobbly anti-poverty program.101 In the medium vulnerability issue of the industrial 
economy—where Fidesz has vilified many european MNCs—the party’s openness 
to Chinese FDI probably did result in modest material benefits for the national econ-
omy. But in the high vulnerability area of bond purchases, Hungary’s initial hopes 
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have been dashed that Chinese institutional investors would represent a major new 
source of state finance.
The article’s third contribution is to make more sense of the truly odd complex of 
policies chosen by the Fidesz governments. While executing this shift from West 
europe towards China and others as a way of establishing its eastern opening, 
Hungary generated a hybrid form of governmentality that combines neoliberalism 
and illiberal logics. The economic system rejects many of the achievements of politi-
cal and economic liberalism that characterise the european integration process,102 
proposes a context-dependent regulatory practice,103 and as Voszka underlines, 
engages in establishing a hybrid economic system that is neither consistently neolib-
eral nor paternalistic.104 Instead, it is ultra-liberal when it comes to tax and social 
policy, but it remains paternalistic on the issue of decreasing utility costs, that is, 
energy and water charges for families. It also aggressively aspires to spread state 
ownership over the economy. The Fidesz government elected in 2014 is inclined to 
engage in further radical transformation, and Orbán has taken pains to denigrate 
liberalism as inadequate to contemporary challenges.
Of course, this trend places Hungary on a trajectory that brings it closer to key 
elements of China’s own hybrid form of governmentality. Late-socialist China 
encompasses both neoliberal techniques (e.g., marketisation of labor, calculative 
choice, and fostering a self-enterprising ethos) in place of state planning along with 
many Maoist-era norms and values, such as serving the country.105 Such hybrid 
forms that combine neoliberalism with illiberal, authoritarian, and nationalist ideolo-
gies and practices can enable us to explain the existence of diverse reactions to neo-
liberal globalisation in semi-peripheries of advanced capitalism. The current 
Hungarian political elite may simply be aspiring to institutionalise their own hybrid 
forms in order to guarantee economic growth that resembles that of China.
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